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Monthly Archives: May 2012

Crime in Suriname

The November 2011 issue of the Law and History Review is devoted to an illuminating symposium on new directions in the study of slavery, edited by Rebecca Scott.  The symposium includes an amazing article by Natalie Davis.  Since this is a blog devoted to enthusiasms, indulge me as I indulge myself.

I am a historian today in large part because of Natalie Zemon Davis.  Back 44 years ago, as an undergraduate at Carleton College, I had just decided that I would try to be a music major because I had decided, in my naiveté, that historians were boring people.  And then I was talked into going to hear a visiting speaker — a Professor Davis from Toronto — who made sixteenth century strikes in Lyons sound so fascinating and who, unlike anyone I had heard to that point, took her audience into the process of thinking reflexively about history. I was hooked.  I changed my major.

Fifteen or sixteen years later, while teaching at the University of Wisconsin, and in the midst of a crisis of confidence about what I was doing as a historian in a law school, I heard Davis’s Curti lectures on the gift relationship.  I felt renewed — challenged and inspired.  And then (I knew there would be one more “then”), I had the privilege — the gift — of being her colleague for a half dozen years, before Davis “retired” from Princeton.

Now, many years beyond her official “retirement,” Davis publishes “Judges, Masters, Diviners: Slaves’ Experience of Criminal Justice in Colonial Suriname,” as part of her continuing inquiry into slaveholding and the lives of slaves in the Dutch colony of Suriname.  Her larger project of reconstructing life in early modern Suriname has required her to learn new languages and literatures.  It has resulted in provocative and illuminating studies of the ironic situation of Jews who moved to Suriname to found a radically free place for themselves and who then, of course, became slaveholders.  But the Law and History Review article pursues a different question, about the various meanings of what “criminal law” meant in a radically violent slave society.

The argument is complex and multifaceted, and it rests on readings of an amazing range of sources in many different languages.  It offers a brilliant and imaginative exploration of legal pluralism as it would have been experienced in a place defined by radically unequal power relations — how slaveholders punished slaves, how the weak state punished or contemplated punishing an occasional, excessively violent slaveholder, and how members of the slave community thought and talked about punishment and criminality.  As befits someone whose scholarly work has for the most part been located in early modern Europe, there are continuing references to the European social history of crime and also reflections on why the violence in places Suriname played no part in the official European legal culture.

The opening pages pursue a relatively conventional and conventionally horrific portrait of the violence and cruelty of punishments that slaveholders visited on slaves in early eighteenth century Suriname.  The illustrations (better viewed on line than in the paper version of the review) are marvelous, but to this point the story told is one that readers in the global slavery literature will have heard before — about sadism and brutality and unconvincing rationalizations.

But then the essay confounds the reader by asking her/him to contemplate what slaves would have understood as punishable offenses and how they would have punished offenders.  And there follows a dizzying exploration of the relationships between ordeals and tortures, and of the multiplicity of legal traditions and practices that shaped this confused and confusing place, Suriname.

The very notion of combining a portrait of what slaveholders called “punishment” for “crimes” with sketches of what Africans would have understood at that time as legitimate punishments for harms done to others leaves the reader slightly queasy and uncertain.  There is something odd or disruptive about asking what were legitimately punishable wrongs, in a context filled with so much sadistic violence.  Still, to “do” history from the “bottom up” means presuming that the slaves themselves carried understandings of criminality and criminal justice.  It might be easier just to leave captured Africa slaves as victims of white power.  Davis, however, leads the reader to ask harder questions: How would recently captured Africans have understood criminality? How might they have meant to police themselves? What would they have regarded as legitimate punishments for harms done to others within their communities?

This is a work at the cutting edge of so many subfields of history.  And yet, at the same time, it is a fascinatingly old fashioned work.  Old fashioned in one particular sense: it is framed by an optimistic (a hard word to use in the context of what is being explored) commitment to the exercise of the historical imagination and to the partial knowability of historical pasts.  For Davis and her readers, torture and punishment — the manifest content of what happened in eighteenth century Suriname — become something more than discursive constructs.  To read Davis is to read something more than a reporting on the contexts of texts.  It is to experience and to imagine killings and tortures authorized by the state and by the controlled and out of control violence of slaveholders.  It is also to remind the reader that the task of understanding historical subjects, of imagining them in their present tense, requires one to reconstruct their memories, their pasts, and their inherited practices.  Their present — their real lives at a particular historical moment — incorporates many histories (including many languages and complex understandings), just as ours does.

“Judges, Masters, Diviners” is a triumph of the moral and historical imagination.

Cite as: Hendrik Hartog, Crime in Suriname, JOTWELL (May 30, 2012) (reviewing Natalie Zemon Davis, Judges, Masters, Diviners: Slaves’ Experience of Criminal Justice in Colonial Suriname, 29 Law and Hist. Rev., 925 (2011)),

The Jim Crow Foundations of Agricultural Governance

Kimberley S. Johnson, Racial Orders, Congress, and the Agricultural Welfare State, 1865-1940, 25 Studies in American Political Development 143 (Oct. 2011).

Kimberley S. Johnson’s recent article, “Racial Orders, Congress, and the Agricultural Welfare State, 1865-1940,” is part of a valuable turn evident in recent scholarship on governance in the twentieth century. Bringing together politics and race to understand agricultural policies and institutions, Johnson asks, “[w]hen does race matter; and how does race matter when thinking about the shaping of the American state?” (P. 144) The answer? Race has shaped agricultural policy in some surprising and not-so-surprising ways.

In her study of the “agricultural welfare state,” Johnson examines the shifting ways in which the federal government provided farmers with services and subsidies in the decades following the Civil War. Responding to scholarship centered on interest group relations and partisan politics, Johnson stresses the importance of considering the political machinations involved in agricultural policy in the specific historical context in which these programs were designed and implemented. She describes in detail the numerous agricultural programs that came out of Congress in the years before the New Deal, and examines how their design and implementation occurred against a backdrop of legalized white supremacy in the rural South. The segregated nature of Southern agriculture combined with the power of Southern Democrats in Congress meant that national agricultural programs reflected the assumptions and preferences of powerful southern interests in maintaining racial hierarchies and allowed local authorities significant discretion in the distribution of assistance. Although the federal government consistently acknowledged its role in protecting farmers from economic dislocation, racial calculations, she argues, destroyed early on any possibility that the federal government would establish universal agricultural benefits as a matter of right.

While this part of her story is not a surprise to readers familiar with scholarship on social welfare programs, she pushes further to demonstrate how the design of these early agricultural programs constrained the options available to Congress and the USDA in shaping later ones. As the USDA learned to work with American farmers and implement agricultural programs, it gained experience doing so through a bifurcated system of benefits that privileged white farmers over African American ones and wealthy farmers over poorer ones. Although membership in each tier varied over time, the two-tiered model remained constant. As Southern Democrats’ power waxed and waned, and as agricultural services gave way to subsidies, more powerful farming interests turned this localism to their advantage and pushed to include themselves in the preferred class of recipients.

By the New Deal, then, “an administrative structure created to partially govern on the basis of race became an important tool by which to govern on the basis of class and land-tenure status.” (P. 145)  The New Deal’s expansive programs were built on the foundations of these older ones and adopted the bifurcated model. Rather than rebuilding the agricultural state or rethinking its design, New Dealers aimed certain programs at wealthier landowners while using others to target poorer tenant farmers. Relying on these previously established structures, she argues, meant that “any inequality established at the beginning became cumulative in scope.” (P. 161)

Johnson’s contributions are several. First, it is apparent how much is gained from looking at policies in their historical context. Broadening the frame beyond the parties directly involved in policy creation offers readers a richer and more complicated narrative about agricultural policy that indicates how closely tied these decisions were to other areas of policy and practice. At the same time, taking racial policy seriously as an influence opens up opportunities to rethink the development of economic regulation more generally. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission both came of age during the period Johnson describes, and the Federal Communications Commission, Maritime Commission, and Civilian Aeronautics Board were not far behind. Examining how contemporary racial orders influenced policy and institutional development in each would greatly enrich our understanding of the modern state.

Finally, it is clear that these observations tell us much about the American state as a whole. As Johnson argues, this “agricultural welfare state” was “America’s first welfare state” (P. 144) and benefits from the kinds of analysis scholars like Ira Katznelson, Robert Lieberman, Linda Gordon, and Suzanne Mettler have applied to social welfare programs like those established by the Social Security Act and the GI Bill. In a variety of areas, deference to local power was built into federal policy in order to entrench the racial and gender status quo. The administration of policies is, these studies demonstrate, as important as the policies themselves; at the same time, scholarship on path dependence makes clear that governance decisions lock in policies and limit future choices. As Johnson makes clear, the USDA offers a remarkable place to see these ideas play out.

Cite as: Joanna Grisinger, The Jim Crow Foundations of Agricultural Governance, JOTWELL (May 2, 2012) (reviewing Kimberley S. Johnson, Racial Orders, Congress, and the Agricultural Welfare State, 1865-1940, 25 Studies in American Political Development 143 (Oct. 2011)),