Islamic legal theory places great importance on the distinction between general and specific language (al-ʿāmm wa al-khāṣṣ). This new article by Omar Farahat draws on the philosophy of law to distinguish between internal and external generality. Internal generality refers to how the law maintains its coherence and intellectual consistency, while external generality deals with how the law applies to different social situations. These are analytical tools used to understand Islamic legal principles and their application. They primarily refer to the way Islamic legal principles are articulated and the scope of their applicability.
Internal generality refers to the universality of Islamic legal principles within the Muslim community such as the obligation to perform daily prayers. These rules imply that a particular legal principle is meant to apply to all Muslims, regardless of their specific social, geographical, or cultural circumstances, provided they meet the conditions of the rule. External generality refers to the applicability or relevance of Islamic legal principles beyond the Muslim community, often in interactions with non-Muslims or in multi-religious contexts. It considers how Islamic principles are communicated or enforced in situations involving non-Muslims or international matters. For example, the principle of upholding contracts applies in dealings with both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Farahat discusses how generality of rules and their exceptions in Islamic legal theory promoted the inner morality of Islamic law. General rules aim to apply broadly, while exceptions provide necessary flexibility. Both generality and specificity play a critical role in ensuring that the law remains coherent and adaptable to different circumstances.
Farahat argues that a central aim of debates on generality and exception in Islamic legal theory was to maintain a coherent relationship between intent, language, and norms. The article highlights the theological underpinnings of these debates, particularly how jurists viewed the relationship between divine intent and the language of legal texts.
Farahat examines how general and specific expressions are discussed by two influential sixth/twelfth century jurist-theologians from different juristic and theological backgrounds: the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E./505 A.H.) and the Central Asian Ḥanafī-Māturīdī ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1145 C.E./539 A.H.). Farahat maintains that these two influential jurists approached the generality-specificity question from different theological perspectives but reached similar practical conclusions about how legal norms should be formulated.
The jurisprudential approaches of al-Ghazālī and al-Samarqandī reflected their views on the relationship between revealed or legislative language and the Legislator (God). First, al-Ghazālī–—representing the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī tradition––viewed law as fundamentally rooted in language. He believed that the jurist’s role was to analyze the language of the law without directly interpreting divine intent.
For al-Ghazālī, generality and specificity were features of language rather than reflections of divine will. He argued that general language should usually be taken at face value unless there were clear indicators that a specific exception applied. Al-Ghazālī positioned the law squarely within the realm of language, detaching it from divine intent, thereby making the jurist’s role purely one of language analysis. This perspective led him to view the generality and specificity of norms as outcomes of particular linguistic investigations, with exceptions seen as mere reflections of the linguistic boundaries of a rule.
On the other hand, al-Samarqandī––from the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī school––took a more intent-focused approach. He assumed a clearer division of labor: norms are embedded in divine intent, while language points to that intent. Thus, the juristic formulation of norms becomes an effort to mirror divine intent in terms of generality and specificity. Al-Samarqandī considered divine intent, however elusive, as the source of revelation. He believed that while general language indicated plurality, it could be subject to specification, and the jurist must carefully discern divine intent in applying general rules.
Farahat concludes that debates among scholars in classical Islamic legal theory were pivotal in bridging theological and practical concerns. These discussions were integral to developing coherent models for deriving normative pronouncements from revealed language. Their models sought to interweave divine speech and human conduct as key to the process of legal creation.
Classical Muslim scholars focused on ensuring that legal norms were internally consistent and aligned with divine will. Farahat explains that, contrary to the premodern jurist-theologians, modern reformists rely on purely hermeneutical techniques as a tool for reform to introduce legal change and suggests that this perspective is not a generative exercise. This article contributes to a deeper understanding and appreciation of how Islamic legal scholars grappled with linguistic and theological questions to produce a vision of law.
Farahat’s contribution challenges the assumptions underlying contemporary approaches in both the legal academy and normative calls by reformists for revival and renewal. He demonstrates how classical Islamic legal theorists were concerned with bridging historical, theological, and practical matters while articulating a vision of law in society. Farahat shows how, in contrast, modern textual approaches suffer from poverty in their conceptual premises. He invites researchers to reject the ahistorical and essentialist notions of text and discipline.
In these discourses, Islamic legal theory is confined to modern legal notions of textual authority rather than the dynamic, God-centric approach of pre-modern Islamic legal thought. Farahat’s goal is to integrate Islamic legal theory into broader socio-political, economic, and moral theories that address modern realities rather than reifying historical disciplines or texts.
